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Abstract: Many contemporary legal philosophers argue that general jurisprudence is 
“descriptive.” I challenge this view in this essay by focusing on one familiar aspect of 
jurisprudence: persistent disagreements among legal philosophers. I argue that this fact is 
in tension with the claim that jurisprudence is descriptive. I consider several possible 
reconciliations of jurisprudential disagreements with descriptivism, but I argue that none 
of them succeeds. I then argue that persistent jurisprudential disagreements are easy to 
explain from within a normative framework. I conclude by suggesting that legal 
philosophers abandon descriptivism in favor of a view that more explicitly sees legal 
philosophy as part of normative political philosophy. 
From a historical perspective the questions that occupy the center stage of 
contemporary analytic jurisprudence are something of a newcomer. The 
philosophy of law has been traditionally understood as a normative enterprise 
with close relations with moral and political philosophy. This is true of both those 
theorists now classified as natural lawyers as it is of those now considered early 
exponents of legal positivism. The twentieth century has seen a radical 
transformation of this understanding of jurisprudence is about. Following the 
very influential work of Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart many legal philosophers, 
especially (but not exclusively) legal positivists, have begun to think that the 
primary task of jurisprudence is descriptive. According to this view, which I will 
call “descriptivism,” jurisprudence is first a conceptual inquiry concerned with 
offering an account of the “nature of law,” it is general in the sense that it is 
applicable to all legal systems, and it is morally neutral in that it does not pass 
judgment on whether law (either in general or any of its particular instantiations) 
is morally good or bad. Descriptivists do not deny, of course, that it is possible to 
talk about specific laws and to pass moral judgment on them, but they insist that 
descriptivism is both possible and that it is a valuable intellectual pursuit. Some 
further argue that the descriptive inquiry is logically prior to the normative one. 
Their opponents challenge either one of the two elements that make up 
descriptivism, insisting that it is impossible to give an account of law that is both 
general and does not appeal to moral considerations, and they deny the claim 
that to the extent one can describe law, this inquiry enjoys logical priority to 
* This essay is in some respects incomplete. It used to have a companion essay that addressed
the question of what it is that legal philosophers purportedly “describe.” It had the additional virtue 
of answering all possible challenges to this essay; it was, alas, kept (without backup) on a computer 
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normative questions. Though descriptivism has not been universally accepted, it 
remains, I think, the more popular view among contemporary legal philosophers.1 
In this essay I challenge descriptivism by arguing that it is inconsistent with the 
nature of jurisprudential debates. 
I 
There are ongoing debates among legal philosophers that purport to be about the 
nature of law. By this I do not refer to debates among lawyers about the 
“grounds” of law in a given legal system, but to the debates among legal 
philosophers themselves about the correct account of the nature of law.2 At their 
narrowest these theories purport to be “descriptive” in that they seek to offer an 
explanation or explication of what law while leaving open the question of whether 
(or when) law is a good or a bad thing. If true, a descriptive theory of law could 
be accepted both by the committed legalist and the philosophical anarchist. But 
these theories are also descriptive in another, though related, sense. They are said 
to be descriptive also in that they purport to tell us what law is without appeal to 
normative considerations, or at least without appeal to practical (moral or 
political) normative considerations. For convenience I will call the normative 
considerations descriptivists allow “non-moral considerations.” The aim of such 
an inquiry is to identify what law is, to be able to provide a good classificatory 
scheme for distinguishing those things that are law from those things that are not. 
The restriction of the inquiry to non-moral considerations is there to identify the 
object of inquiry in an objective fashion, not unlike scientists’ identification of the 
nature of physical substances. And it is exactly for this reason that the findings 
are descriptive also in the first sense: just as the correct identification of the 
physical structure of say, water, does not pass judgment on whether water is a 
good or a bad thing, so does the correct identification of the nature of law remain 
silent on whether having law is good or bad.  
There are differences among the various defenses of descriptivism. One 
difference in particular is of significance for my argument: some descriptivists 
1 Among other endorsements of descriptivism see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994) 239–44; Scott J. Shapiro, Legality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2011) 2–4; Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Rule of Rules: Morality, Rules, 
and the Dilemmas of Law (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001) 204–09; John Gardner, Law as a 
Leap of Faith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 23–24; Andrei Marmor, Philosophy of Law 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press 2011) ch. 5; Jules L. Coleman, “Beyond the Separability 
Thesis: Moral Semantics and the Methodology of Jurisprudence,” 27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
581, 597–608 (2007). Another defense of “descriptive jurisprudence” is found in Brian Leiter, 
Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and on Naturalism in Legal Philosophy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 164–75, but there are some significant differences between 
Letier’s views and those of other descriptivists, so my argument here is not directed at his views. 
2 The main strategy of the leading anti-descriptivist, Ronald Dworkin, has been to argue that it 
is impossible to distinguish clearly between these two types of question. If this were true, then 
jurisprudential debates (and disagreements) would be unquestionably morally evaluative. 
Dworkin’s claim has been vigorously denied by descriptivists. My argument does not depend on 
this claim and to narrow the scope of potential disagreement with descriptivists I assume they are 
correct on this point. 
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contend that they describe “the concept of law,” while others claim to explain 
“the nature of law,” or “law itself.” The distinction is often elided—Hart, to take 
one prominent example, freely moved between talking about “the concept of 
law” and the “nature of law”—but it will prove important. By the “concept” of 
law I refer to something like people’s beliefs about law, roughly along the sense 
psychologists use the term concept; by “nature,” I refer to the practice itself. The 
argument I develop below is concerned with those theorists who purport to 
explicate the nature of law.3 It is this understanding of descriptive jurisprudence 
that is difficult to reconcile with the fact of persistent disagreement.  
II 
My argument, in brief, is that the existence and persistence of disagreements over 
the nature of law gives us reason to doubt the claim that jurisprudential 
disagreements are in fact descriptive in the sense identified above. Now, 
unquestionably, that disagreements exist over a descriptive question is not 
immediately a cause for concern, nor is it a reason to doubt the descriptiveness of 
the question. I may disagree with you on what I take to be an unquestionably 
descriptive question, say, the height of the Empire State Building. The 
straightforward explanation for our disagreement is, typically, at least one of us is 
mistaken. It is also typical of such disagreements, however, that they are not 
persistent; all we need to do is find a source we accept as authoritative on the 
matter, consult it and find who of us (if any) is right.  
The mere fact of persistence also does not automatically warrant the 
conclusion that the disagreements are not descriptive; but it does call for an 
explanation. As I see it, there are four potential explanations for persistent 
disagreements that are consistent with descriptivism. I call the first epistemic 
deficiency. In cases of epistemic deficiency there is insufficient data on a matter 
under consideration resulting in gaps that leave room for several competing 
descriptive accounts. Currently, for example, there is disagreement among 
evolutionary theorists on what provides a better account of the process of natural 
selection, whether it is through slow, relatively constant, changes (a view called 
“gradualism”), or whether it is in spurts of relatively quick change followed by 
period of relative stasis (this is known as the “punctuated equilibria” view). This 
is, at its core, an empirical question, but it is one for which much of the relevant 
evidence is not available. If better data on Earth’s natural history were available, 
scientists would be able to answer which of these two (if any) is correct. While the 
debate in this example is still open, the history of science provides numerous 
3 For claims to explicating the nature of law (law itself) rather than the concept of law see 
Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith, p. 276 n. 14; Michael S. Moore, Educating Oneself in Public: 
Critical Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 311; Andrei Marmor, 
“Farewell to Conceptual Analysis (in Jurisprudence),” in Wil Waluchow & Stefan Schiaraffa (eds), 
Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 209, 216–17. 
For a very close argument see Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law 








examples of scientific disputes that were resolved once more evidence became 
available.  
The second possible explanation for persistent descriptive disagreements is 
the complexity of the object. The idea here is quite straightforward: The complexity 
of the object of inquiry makes it difficult to provide an accurate description of it, 
hence the potential for persistent disagreements. Applied to the domain of 
jurisprudence, disagreements over what law is exist and persist because the 
subject-matter to be explained—law—is very complex and disagreements result 
from theorists’ endless struggle to get a better grasp of legal phenomena. 
A third possible source of persistent descriptive disagreements may be, 
explicitly or implicitly, the result of disagreement over values. I assume that even 
the most committed moral realist will admit that there are persistent 
disagreements over moral questions and that there is currently no agreed method 
of resolving them. As a result, evaluative disagreements are difficult to resolve and 
are typically persistent. Call these “moral evaluative disagreements.” On some 
metaethical views moral evaluative disagreements are the result of epistemic 
deficiency on moral matters, but for the moment I will assume this is not the 
case. For those who believe that the source of disagreement on moral matters is 
epistemic, moral evaluative disagreements are therefore a special case of what I 
called epistemic deficiency. (I say something about this possibility below.) 
The final possible source of persistent disagreement consistent with 
descriptivism is what I call apparent disagreement. Apparent disagreements exist 
when, despite appearances and disputants’ own beliefs, they do not in fact talk 
about the same thing. For example, if two people disagree over whether Dworkin 
thinks people have a right to pornography, their disagreement may be due to the 
fact that one is talking about Ronald while the other about Andrea. Though 
facetious, this example highlights an important point about apparent 
disagreements, namely that though definitely possible, apparent disagreements 
are less likely to persist as usually their nature can be discovered fairly quickly. 
Indeed, those cases in which disagreements of this type persist are likely to be 
cases of epistemic deficiency that leads disputants to mistakenly treat two 
different things as though they were one (or as two different tokens of a single 
type). As such, the only real cases of this source of disagreement are typically 
going to be, once again, a special case of the first source of persistent 
disagreement identified above. Nevertheless, because this case calls for some 
independent consideration, I will consider apparent disagreements separately 
below. 
It is time to advance my argument against descriptivism. In a nutshell, it is 
that descriptivism is a true and significant research program for jurisprudence only if the 
source of disagreement among legal philosophers is epistemic deficiency or complexity; but 
neither is a plausible explanation of jurisprudential disagreements. Hence, 
jurisprudential descriptivism is either false or pointless. Let me now try and 











I start with the explanation that seems most obviously inconsistent with 
descriptivism, namely that jurisprudential disagreements persist because, at 
bottom, they are disagreements over moral evaluative questions. The one great 
virtue of this possibility is that it provides an easy answer to the puzzle of 
persistent jurisprudential disagreements; on the other hand, this answer seems 
inconsistent, in a fairly obvious manner, with descriptivism. This can be fairly 
easily seen if we think of Dworkin’s challenge to legal positivism. In many of 
Dworkin’s writings he focused on the fact of disagreement within the law (i.e., 
not the disagreements I am concerned with here) as an embarrassment to 
positivist theories of law, and for which Dworkin’s view of law as a domain of 
moral decision-making offered a ready answer. Moving this argument to the level 
of jurisprudential discussion does not, at first sight, make any difference. That 
seems to have been Dworkin’s own view, as in his later writings he relied on 
something like this argument in support of the view that legal philosophy is 
evaluative.4 If we accept that the reason why jurisprudential disagreements persist 
is because they are moral, does this not immediately show that descriptivism is 
false?  
One way of trying to overcome this challenge is to adopt the view that 
descriptivism requires only describing evaluative judgments, not making a moral 
argument or taking a stand on an evaluative question. Such an argument has 
been made for the sake of explaining how jurisprudence can remain descriptive in 
the context of considering evaluative judgments within the law. As Hart put it, 
“[d]escription may still be a description, even when what is described is an 
evaluation.”5 But whatever are the merits of this view in the context of legal 
philosophers’ describing the attitudes of those who take part in legal practice,6 
this argument cannot be used when evaluative premises are, ex hypothesi, the 
source of the disagreement among legal theorists. In such a case if one can 
describe such evaluative attitudes in a morally neutral manner, then we would not 
expect to see disagreement. If disagreements persist when describing a moral 
attitude, we are once again facing the problem of explaining persistent 
disagreements. Indeed, an admission that such disagreements are possible may be 
a reason for doubting the claim that it is possible to describe a normative attitude 
neutrally. 
Another possibility might be to argue that the supposed contrast between 
evaluative and descriptive disagreements is misleading, because evaluative 
disagreements may be descriptive. To say of a sentence that it is evaluative, on 
this view, is to say that it relates to questions of value, i.e. it is to say something 
about the reference of the sentence. To say of a sentence that it is descriptive, on 
the other hand, is to say something about its nature, to say, roughly, that it is 
about a matter of fact. On this view, it is possible for a sentence to be evaluative 
                                                
4 Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 2006) ch. 6. 
5 Hart, Concept of Law, p. 244. 
6 For some doubts see Danny Priel, “Evaluating Descriptive Jurisprudence,” 52 American 








(referring to value) and descriptive (factual) at the same time if we believe that 
there are facts “in the world” on matters of value.7  
Would accepting this possibility salvage descriptive jurisprudence? As a 
historical matter, “descriptive jurisprudence” is associated with legal positivism, 
and the latter has been attractive to some legal theorists, most famously H.L.A. 
Hart, who were skeptical of claims of the descriptiveness of ethics, and whom I 
suspect may have been attracted to descriptive jurisprudence exactly because it 
was grounded on the firmer factual ground of social practice than on that of 
morality. The point is, however, of interest beyond intellectual history. 
Descriptive jurisprudence was premised on the idea that it is possible to give an 
account of legal practice that is not grounded in morality, that jurisprudential 
disputes were about the “classificatory” question of what counted as law. The 
possibility considered here concedes that jurisprudential debates are, at least in 
part, moral or political debates in disguise, but then tries to salvage descriptivism 
by appealing to a controversial metaethical theory. Even if this theory is accepted, 
it is doubtful whether it leaves more than the shell of descriptivism. Descriptivism 
is based on the view that law is a social practice and as such explicable as a matter 
of fact. On the reinterpretation under consideration, it turns out that this is false. 
To accept this explanation for the persistence of jurisprudential debates is to 
admit what has always been understood (by proponents and challengers of 
descriptivism alike) to be the antithesis of descriptivism, namely that 
jurisprudential debates really are moral or political disputes in disguise. What 
does not change is that the disagreement is persistent and its persistence is due to 
the fact that questions of value are impossible to resolve. To learn from a 
metaethical theory that the debate is nevertheless descriptive because questions of 
value are factual is small consolation indeed, if we cannot in any way ascertain 
them. Put somewhat differently, the motivation for jurisprudential descriptivism 
has been the belief that one need not engage in evaluation in jurisprudential 
inquiry. That motivation does not change when we discover that evaluative 




I turn to consider the possibility that jurisprudential disagreements are apparent 
disagreements. This may seem a surprising suggestion, for if true, that would 
imply that many jurisprudential debates are in fact not genuine debates, that 
much time and effort has been spent on debates in which disputants are in fact 
arguing past each other. Another reason to doubt this explanation has much to 
                                                
7 See Dan Priel, “Description and Evaluation in Jurisprudence,” 29 Law and Philosophy 633, 
641–44 (2010). The questions of value are factual is related to the view that questions of value of 
objective, but the link is complex. At least some moral objectivists, such as Dworkin, have insisted 
that fact and value comprise of two separate domains. See Dworkin, Justice in Robes, pp. 76–78. 
Consequently, for Dworkin questions of value were inherently contested and (in the sense used in 
the text) non-descriptive. This is consistent with his “right answer thesis,” because of the 








do with jurisprudential disagreement is that, as mentioned earlier, we expect such 
disagreements to be resolved rather quickly, once the parties realize they do not 
really disagree. To be persistent on this account, it has to be the case that 
jurisprudential disagreements are apparent but those who engage in them do not 
(and perhaps cannot) learn this fact.  
Despite its apparent oddity, the suggestion that jurisprudential disagreements 
are apparent should be fairly familiar. A common strategy for explaining away 
several longstanding jurisprudential disagreements has been to argue that they are 
the result of apparent disagreement. It has been suggested, for instance, that 
natural lawyers are concerned with the case of moral or just law whereas legal 
positivists seek to explain its less exalted instantiations; or to pick another well-
known example, it has been suggested that much of the disagreement between 
legal positivists and Dworkin may simply reflect failure to notice that positivists 
offer a theory of law and Dworkin a theory of adjudication.8 The first thing to 
note about these suggestions is that they do not correspond to how natural 
lawyers or Dworkin understand their own work: These critics of legal positivism 
clearly considered their views a challenge to positivist views and when faced with 
such conciliatory suggestions they flatly rejected them.9 But the issue is not 
merely “biographical.” After all, it is possible that these theorists have 
misunderstood their work or its implications. The heart of the matter is that 
explanations of different aspects of a single phenomenon are, if they are both 
true, complementary; indeed, necessarily so. Explaining jurisprudential 
disagreement as the result of apparent disagreement of this sort requires us to 
accept that virtually all legal theorists made not only the error of failing to notice 
their accounts dealt with different matters, but also the further error of finding 
conflicts among themselves when none existed. While not impossible, the 
suggestion that such global misunderstanding is at the heart of all debates among 
legal philosophers seems rather implausible. What is even more curious is that 
such misunderstandings would persist (on what is said to be a descriptive matter) 
even after the error has been pointed out. If that were the source of all 
jurisprudential disagreements, one would wish to see an explanation as to why so 
many intelligent legal theorists continue to get their own views so badly confused.  
While I do not find these particular examples very compelling, I nevertheless 
believe that apparent disagreements count for at least some persistent 
disagreement in jurisprudence. The first important source of apparent 
disagreement in jurisprudence is that legal philosophers have different views on 
what counts as law, what belongs to the object to be explained. This is because 
different legal theorists do not approach their theoretical inquiries with a clean 
slate; rather, they enter into the debate with different assumptions on the sort of 
things that belong to the object of inquiry. Some legal theorists, to make this 
point less abstract, are pretheoretical “natural lawyers” and therefore do not 
                                                
8 For examples of these strategies: With regard to natural law see Gardner, Law as a Leap of 
Faith, pp. 51–53; with regard to Dworkin see ibid., p. 184.  
9 See John Finnis, “Law and What I Truly Should Decide,” American Journal of Jurisprudence, 








include unjust legislative prescriptions as part of the object to be explained while 
others are pretheoretical “legal positivists,” who do. As a result of their different 
starting points, they end up with conflicting descriptive theories, but because the 
disagreement exists at a level that cannot be touched by their descriptive theories, 
the disagreements persist. Apart from the problem of circularity (what justifies 
those pretheoretical starting points?), to the extent that jurisprudential 
disagreements are the result of such pretheoretical disagreements, it looks like no 
descriptive theory can convince those not already committed to the starting point 
it is based on, hence the persistence of (some) jurisprudential disagreements. 
That is a serious problem for descriptivism, and it is the result of the fact that 
unlike in the case of scientific description, there is neither an agreed-upon 
“sample” on which different theorists can theorize, nor an agreed-upon 
methodology that can be used to determine that sample without biasing the 
conclusion in favor of one approach. As a result, it is always possible to dismiss 
any potential counterexample to one’s theory as not really a case of law, 
something that each side can do since what counts as law is not fixed in advance. 
Even the choice of methodology for fixing the object of inquiry is itself suspect 
and potentially question-begging for, once again, favoring one conclusion over 
others. To give a concrete example: what role, if any, should prevailing attitudes 
among people play in answering the question of the nature of law? We can 
imagine at least three different answers: according to the first, prevailing attitudes 
should play no role whatsoever, for the philosophical inquiry into the nature of 
law is entirely separate from the sociological one; according to a second, we 
should conduct surveys to examine people’s attitudes on the matter; and 
according to a third, we should be interested in people’s attitudes on the matter, 
but there is no need for surveys because the philosopher can rely on himself and 
his own experiences as a guide for this question. (There are, of course, other 
possibilities and variations on these three basic types.) Further complicating the 
matter is the fact that these positions can relate to two levels of inquiry, that of 
setting the object of inquiry and that of providing the explanatory (or descriptive) 
theory. There are, therefore, at least six methodological positions, and different 
legal theorists have expressed different views on the choice among them. And yet, 
until we have been given a reason to favor one answer over others, the prospects 
for descriptive jurisprudence that does not beg all important questions look grim. 
Crucially for our purposes, the question of the choice between these possibilities 
cannot itself be considered “descriptive.”  
To avoid talking past each other legal philosophers will have to agree on a 
“descriptive” (in this context: normatively neutral) way of deciding what counts 
as law prior to beginning their theorizing. It is not clear how they can do that, 
when the question what counts as law is exactly what the point of contention 
among them. What is likely to happen is that each side will favor the 
methodology that fits its preconceptions. In fact, I believe this is exactly what has 
happened: much of the debate between legal positivists and anti-positivists these 
days revolves implicitly around the question whether the question of the nature of 








that involves addressing questions about nature and human nature.10 If one 
adopts the former approach, the conclusion that law is a “social construction,” 
nowadays taken by many legal positivists to be the core of their view, follows 
almost inevitably. If one adopts the latter approach, that conclusion appears, at 
the very least, incomplete.  
This problem can be generalized: a central reason why jurisprudential 
disagreements persist is because of underlying methodological issues: the point of 
jurisprudence and philosophy, the nature of explanation in general and of social 
phenomena in particular. These are wide-ranging issues, but if they have one 
thing in common is that none of them can be called “descriptive.” (I return to 
this issue below.)  
Another possible source of apparent disagreement in jurisprudence is 
mistaken generalizations. The problem here is that in spite of legal philosophers’ 
claims to generality, they are in fact often erroneously trying to generate an 
account of the “nature” of law in general from the few legal systems they happen 
to be familiar with, despite the fact that different legal systems—contrary to 
descriptivists’ assumptions—do not share a single nature. On this view, 
disagreement may be the result of different generalizations based on different 
phenomena. Though this possibility is often dismissed out of hand by 
descriptivists, I think something like it explains some jurisprudential 
disagreements. There are fundamental differences between different legal systems 
that reflect different understandings of what law is (differences that ultimately 
arise from different normative views on the role of law, as well as differences in 
the social, political, and technological environment), and that some of the 
disagreements among legal philosophers, as well as their persistence, are the 
result of failure to take such differences into account.11   
Those who reject this claim may raise two valid challenges: First, to claim 
that different legal systems belong to different kinds must presuppose some way 
of individuating legal systems, something that the arguments about circularity 
mentioned earlier preclude. Even if this problem is overcome, a second challenge 
arises, namely, why would such disagreements persist when the information on 
the locality of explanation is readily available? The brief answer to the first 
challenge is that it is possible to individuate legal systems to different “types” on 
evaluative grounds, i.e. exactly in a way that is not available to the descriptivist. 
My response to the second challenge is the “sociological” observation that most 
legal philosophers, and especially so these days, do not seem particularly 
interested in actual law beyond their (often limited) knowledge of their own legal 
system, nor do they take particular interest in those disciplines (comparative law, 
legal anthropology, and legal history) that provide the relevant information for 
assessing such a claim.  
                                                
10 See Dan Priel, “Toward Classical Legal Positivism” (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1886517. 
11 See Dan Priel, “Is There One Right Answer to the Question of the Nature of Law?” in 
Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law, 322. For examples of dismissal of such a claim see 








I do not want to spend too much time on this issue or press it too strongly, 
because the relevance of this observation is tangential for the matter at hand. If I 
am wrong about it, that simply means that one potential source for explaining the 
source of jurisprudential disagreement is unavailable. If it is true, descriptivism 
may remain a viable possibility on a more local level, once we distinguish between 
the different phenomena put together under the same label, “law.” But even if we 
accept this possibility, the difficulties for descriptivism are far from over. First, 
deciding whether two different phenomena are two tokens of the same type is not 
something that can be done by mere observation and description, as different 
phenomena in the world do not come with labels attached to them. Therefore, 
adopting this as an explanation for jurisprudential disagreement will require 
justifying which of the differences between various specimens of law are 
differences between tokens of the same type and which are separate types. This 
means that the problems identified at the level of general jurisprudence cannot be 
avoided by attempting to defend descriptivism on a smaller scale. Distinguishing 
between different types within the category “law” will require an underlying 
theory, which brings back the problem of circularity mentioned above.  
Even if we manage to overcome this problem, it will still require a major 
change in descriptivism. Recall that one of the two central elements of 
descriptivism is that it offers a general description of law. This is no small thing. 
Describing the important elements of particular legal systems is exactly the sort of 
thing descriptivists themselves claim not to be doing, the sort of task they consider 
as the appropriate domain of empirical social scientists.12 Therefore, narrowing 
down the aims of descriptive jurisprudence in this way will raise doubts on its 
very point and will presumably call for some fundamental changes in the methods 
legal philosophers use. In particular, one would expect their work to be much 
more grounded in empirical facts on particular legal systems than it currently is. 
 
V 
I turn now to epistemic deficiency and complexity as possible reconciliations of 
persistent jurisprudential disagreements with descriptivism. Let me start with the 
first possibility, because it is a more evidently implausible explanation for 
jurisprudential disagreement. As far as I know, there are no constitutions to be 
unearthed, statutes whose content awaits interpretation, or any other missing 
facts that if found would bring any open jurisprudential question to an end. To 
be sure, we do not know everything that can be known about all historical forms 
of law, just as we do not know many aspects of life in ancient times. But that is 
besides my point, because there is no suggestion that certain currently open 
jurisprudential disputes on the nature of law would be resolved if only we had 
some information about ancient legal systems we currently lack. That is not just 
my own view. Unlike cases of scientific epistemic deficiency when scientists can 
tell what evidence will resolve an open scientific dispute (and when possible they 
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often go on to construct and conduct experiments in an attempt to gather it), I 
know of no suggestion from any jurisprudential descriptivist that any presently 
open jurisprudential disagreement will be resolved if only certain facts become 
known.  
It is this crucial difference between jurisprudential and scientific 
disagreements that explains why Scott Shapiro’s recent attempt to explain 
jurisprudential disagreements is inapt. According to Shapiro, “[j]ust as two 
detectives can disagree about which suspect committed the crime, two 
philosophers can disagree about what makes an entity the thing that it is.”13 In his 
scenario disagreement is possible because it is the result of epistemic deficiency. 
Even if the available evidence renders several possible scenarios equally plausible, 
we can conceive of additional evidence that would have shown which of the 
detectives (if any) is right. In his scenario, for example, a security camera installed 
at the crime scene could have resolved the detectives’ disagreements. There is 
simply nothing comparable in jurisprudence.  
Complexity is a more serious possibility. Here, if you wish, the source of the 
disagreement is not the insufficiency of data but the insufficiency of legal 
theorists’ cognitive capacities. Obviously, this is a possibility that can never be 
ruled out, but I think it provides little assistance to defenders of descriptivism. To 
see why, we need to look a bit more closely at the potential sources of complexity 
and their implications for jurisprudential disagreement. In general we can 
distinguish between complexity of the explanandum and complexity of the 
explanans. I begin with the former.  
Though superficially appealing, the complexity of the explanandum actually 
fits jurisprudential disagreements rather poorly. Legal phenomena are indeed 
multifaceted and varied; nonetheless, their complexity should not be exaggerated. 
Law is not quantum mechanics (about which Richard Feynman is reputed to 
have said: “if you think you understand quantum mechanics you don’t 
understand quantum mechanics”). When one examines jurisprudential 
disagreements, they are not normally accusations of ignoring some facts or of 
leaving out some aspect of a complex phenomenon, but are rather the result of 
challenging a competing explanation of the same, typically not exceptionally 
complex, set of facts. A related difficulty with this explanation lies not with what 
we see in jurisprudential debates, but with what we do not. If it had really been 
the complexity of the explained phenomena that accounted for jurisprudential 
disagreement we would have expected to see the sort of progress we do see in the 
paradigm of “descriptive” inquiries, science, where complex theories are built up 
from an accumulation of answers to small-scale and typically less controversial 
questions. There is, however, no such accumulation of accepted answers in 
jurisprudence. I cannot think of a single small-scale problem that has been solved 
to (virtually) everyone’s satisfaction. In fact, there is not even agreement on wrong 
answers. Among prominent legal philosophers today some believe coercion is 
essential to law, others do not; some believe that the gunman situation writ large 
                                                








can under certain situations be a legal system, while others deny this; some 
believe that morality is necessarily connected to law, others firmly deny this. The 
list goes on and on. These disagreements are hard to square with the suggestion 
that the source of such disagreements is due to the complexity of law.   
There is a different potential source of legal complexity that may be of greater 
explanatory power, but unfortunately for descriptivists, if it is true, it undermines 
descriptivism in a different way. One reason why law may be complex is that it 
was the product of the workings of many people in different times and places, 
holding very different and often conflicting views on law, society, morals and 
politics. Their different views have not just been exogenous evaluations of legal 
phenomena; rather, these beliefs influenced actions within the law and thereby 
helped shape what law is. This resulted in a practice within which one finds, say, 
“positivistic” aspects alongside “non-positivistic” ones, because those who give 
shape to legal phenomena (legislators, judges, lawyers, lay people) have reshaped 
legal practice on the basis of their conflicting beliefs. Unlike the complexity in the 
practical aspects of law, which legal philosophers tend to ignore as irrelevant, this 
diversity of views touches on the very issues they are concerned to illuminate. 
The different attitudes of those involved in the law lead to a social practice that is 
constantly being pulled in different directions. Legal philosophers typically ignore 
this diversity of views, treating, say, Cicero’s claims about the nature of law as 
external observations about the nature of law (which they can then assess as true 
or false), and not the statements of a legal insider whose beliefs also contributed 
to the constitution of what law is.  
This complexity provides a straightforward explanation for some 
jurisprudential disagreements—different descriptivists have their own views about 
law and they (naturally) highlight in their accounts those features that align with 
these views and neglect those that do not—but in doing so it also provides what 
may be the greatest challenge to descriptivism. For if the possibility just outlined 
is true, conflicting jurisprudential descriptivists are all wrong for ignoring this 
complexity and offering overly simplified, incomplete, and for that reason 
erroneous, accounts of law. In short, if law is complex in this sense, then the 
overly neat and organized accounts legal philosophers give us are not faithful 
descriptions of the nature of law, but are explanations simplified and sanitized to 
such a degree that the result cannot plausibly be called a “description” of their 
purported object.  
The only way to avoid this conclusion is to argue that beyond all the 
differences among legal practitioners there is a core that all agree on and that it is 
this core of legal practice that legal philosophers can and should describe. There 
are, however, at least three problems with this suggestion. First, this claim needs 
to be shown rather assumed; second, it is not easy to both maintain this claim 
and the one that remaining disagreements among legal philosophers are about the 
description of this supposedly uncontroversial core; and finally, this core, even if 
it exists, is likely to be so thin that it will not capture anything that could be 









What about the complexity of the explanans? There are considerable 
difficulties with this possibility as well. Legal philosophers typically leave out from 
their discussions much of what makes law complex. According to descriptivists 
the philosophical question of the nature of law is understood as the search for 
law’s necessary features or its existence conditions. Consequently, much of the 
diversity (and hence complexity) of real-world legal phenomena is off bounds as 
far as most legal philosophers are concerned. In fact, to the extent that the 
complexity of legal phenomena still remains a problem that leads to persistent 
jurisprudential disagreements, it casts doubt on the appropriateness of 
philosophical method as a means for dealing with the task of a descriptive 
account of law. Philosophy is not the only (and typically not the primary) method 
for describing social phenomena (as opposed to the question of the explaining the 
ontological status of social phenomena, of what makes them possible). If 
descriptive jurisprudence fails so spectacularly at providing determinate and 
agreed-upon answers to the question of describing the essence of a familiar social 
practice, this gives us reason to doubt whether it is the right tool for the task. In 
other words, claiming that jurisprudence is descriptive and explaining 
jurisprudential disagreements as a result of the complexity of law, when coupled 
with the failure of this enterprise to generate uncontroversial descriptions of even 
the most basic aspects of law, will tend to suggest that the problem lies in the 
method used to describe the phenomenon: specifically, the inadequacy of the 
fact-thin methods of legal philosophers in addressing and describing the factual 
complexity of the social phenomena they are investigating. 
 
VI 
The following table summarizes the different explanations considered in this 
essay for explaining jurisprudential disagreements and the reason why each of 
them undermines descriptivism: 
Explanation of the disagreement Problem for descriptivism 
Evaluative moral disagreement Descriptivism is straightforwardly false. 
Evaluative epistemic disagreements Debates in jurisprudence are pointless 
so long as theorists do not find the right 
way of explaining law. 
Apparent disagreement Implausible as an explanation of 
disagreement; but if true disagreement 
is pointless and trying to resolve the 
disagreement undermines the 
motivation for analytic jurisprudence. 
Epistemic deficiency Unlikely explanation of jurisprudential 
disagreements. 
Complexity of legal phenomena Does not fit most jurisprudential 
disagreements; and if true undermines 










If the arguments just summarized are along the right lines, we have reason to 
doubt that the branch of jurisprudence that purports to be descriptive is indeed 
so, because descriptive debates only manifest persistence under certain 
conditions, none of which pertains to jurisprudential debates.  
I consider now several possible objections to my argument. The first, one that 
I treat briefly, is that even though each explanation considered above in isolation 
cannot explain why jurisprudence is descriptive, some combination of them can. 
Or it might be contended that I failed to consider an argument for explaining the 
persistence of jurisprudential disagreement that will satisfy committed 
descriptivists. Both challenges are, of course, possible. Without more, all I can 
say is that these challenges are empty without further details. In any case, even if 
ultimately unsuccessful, the argument of this essay should prove helpful in 
making sense of the terrain of descriptive jurisprudence and for a more fruitful 
discussion of its merits. 
The second possible objection, one that I encountered in one form or another 
from several readers, is that my arguments must be false, because if true, they 
bring down with them not just descriptive jurisprudence but the whole of 
philosophy. After all, if there is one thing that has characterized philosophy 
throughout all its history is the intractability of its questions and the persistence 
of its debates. Phrased in more positive terms, it may be argued that there is 
something inherently intractable about philosophical debates, and that my 
arguments miss this feature of philosophical debates by treating them as though 
they were empirical. The first thing to say in response is that it is (usually) no 
answer to a crime to say that others are guilty of it as well; and labeling a debate 
“philosophical” does not relieve it of normative standards relevant to other 
inquiries. It bears asking why philosophical debates are persistent, why some age-
old questions of philosophy are still with us. It is also notable that those that do 
not, have usually been answered by other disciplines. If all this means that a 
branch of philosophy, or even all of it, cannot be salvaged, so be it. But, in any 
case, I do not actually think that all of philosophy similarly affected by my 
arguments. Few philosophers these days, as far as I know, call their work 
“descriptive.” Even if we expand this category to mean “conceptual,” then 
conceptual analysis has met with hard times, from philosophers perhaps more 
than anyone else. It has its defenders too, but to argue that all philosophical 
reflection is a form of conceptual analysis (which is what this challenge amounts 
to) is an unlikely claim. Whatever may be the faults in those branches of 
philosophy that do not purport to be descriptive, the arguments presented in this 
essay do not affect them. 
More specifically, when considered more closely, it is at least arguable that 
some of the rejected explanations for the persistence of jurisprudential debates 
are available for explaining the persistence of other philosophical debates. Some 
debates in philosophy probably persist because of epistemic deficiency (some 
questions in the philosophy of mind are likely examples, as are some aspects in 
the debate over free will). More importantly, the arguments presented here do 








jurisprudential explanations were modeled on something like reflective 
equilibrium, the argument presented here would have left it largely unscathed. 
(That is not to say that the method of reflective equilibrium has not had its 
critics, only that those criticisms are unrelated to the ones raised here against 
descriptivism.) But to think of jurisprudence on the reflective equilibrium model 
means thinking of it as a normative inquiry. True, reflective equilibrium starts 
with prevailing understandings of our practices and checks them against our 
intuitions, but it is a normative endeavor that seeks to justify and improve our 
practices. Further, the method of reflective equilibrium is justified for its ability to 
offer reinterpretations of familiar concepts that are normatively attractive, thereby 
providing a framework for improving human institutions. This is very different 
from descriptive jurisprudence.  
A different objection is that I have missed my target, because in fact even 
descriptivists concede the role of evaluation in jurisprudential inquiry: what they 
reject is that those values are moral or political.14 Real jurisprudential 
descriptivists, then, can accept that a main source of jurisprudential disagreement 
is evaluative, but deny that it is moral evaluation. Call this view “weak 
descriptivism.”15  
For reasons I explained in some detail elsewhere, I believe weak descriptivism 
is an unstable and indefensible position,16 but we can largely ignore these 
arguments here. We can assume that weak descriptivism is sound. In one recently 
popular version of weak descriptivism, jurisprudential theory requires making 
judgments of importance.17 Though I have not encountered this specific 
argument from defenders of this view, one might try to explain the persistence of 
jurisprudential disagreement on disagreements on what aspects of legal 
phenomena are important.  
This suggestion may seem promising at first, but it suffers from several 
significant difficulties. It is worth pointing out first it simply does not correspond 
to jurisprudential discourse. Pick any of the most prominent works in 
jurisprudence of the last few decades: arguments in it are not typically that other 
legal theorists give too much or too little weight to certain aspects of law; it is that 
competing views are wrong. This is hard to reconcile with the claim that 
evaluative disagreements in jurisprudence are all based on different judgments of 
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importance. A second difficulty with this suggestion is that different emphases 
should not lead to conflicts. It is normally not difficult to recognize that two 
accounts that differ simply in how much they highlight different aspects of a 
single phenomenon. Therefore, for this to count as the source of jurisprudential 
disagreements what is needed is the further assumption that these different 
judgments of importance have been globally mistaken for something else. As I see 
it, the most likely reason why this might be so is if different judgments of 
importance is if they affect legal practice, i.e. if judging certain features of law to 
be more important than others leads to a somewhat different legal practice. But 
this explanation is fundamentally at odds with descriptivism, for it suggests that 
legal philosophers do not stand outside legal practice merely observing and 
describing it, but rather (inadvertently or not) they take a stand—a normative 
stand—between different possible forms that legal practice takes. That would 
show that judgments of importance are in fact implicit judgments as to the 
relative merits of different forms of legal practice.  
Assume, however, that I am wrong about all this too, i.e. that the source of 
jurisprudential disagreement is evaluative and exclusively confined to 
disagreement over assessments of the important features of law. Accepting this as 
the source of persistent jurisprudential disagreements will prove a pyrrhic victory 
for the descriptivist, for if this is the case, that will render jurisprudential disputes 
beyond argument. As far as I know there is no way of adjudicating between 
judgments of importance, for they are subjective: if I think that certain features of 
law that I find important vindicate “natural law theory” and you think that other 
features that you find important lead to “legal positivism,” it is hard to see the 
point of us debating our views, because each can only be assessed relative to 
those judgments of importance, and those judgments themselves are beyond 
dispute. Descriptivists must implicitly accept this point, because if they did not, 
they would probably address this question and suggest a way of identifying 
correct and incorrect judgments of importance in order to resolve jurisprudential 
disputes in this way. I know of no attempt to do that.18  
Perhaps, however, this focus on judgments of importance is insufficiently 
narrow. Perhaps jurisprudential disagreements are the result of competing 
epistemic values. This is a more plausible version of weak descriptivism, but 
again I find it unlikely that it is only epistemic values that explain jurisprudential 
disagreements. They definitely do not seem that way. Those who propose this as 
the source of persistent jurisprudential disagreements need to show how 
evaluative disagreements about the nature of a normative institution such as law 
can steer clear of moral or political considerations. I would further wish to see an 
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argument demonstrating how virtually all jurisprudential disagreements are the 
result of disagreement over epistemic values. It is worth highlighting in this 
context that disagreements of this sort are likely to result from different views 
about the proper way of explaining human action, and that such disagreements 
are themselves not easily disentangled from moral and political questions. (As an 
example consider debates about the relationship between rationality and 
morality.)  
However, for the sake of argument, as before, I am willing to grant the 
assumption that moral evaluative considerations do not form any part of the 
evaluative considerations that affect persistent jurisprudential disagreements. 
Once again, an immediate implication of this view is that most debates among 
legal philosophers are misguided, although this time for a somewhat different 
reason than before: it follows from this version of weak descriptivism that 
disagreements among legal philosophers that purport to be about the nature of 
law are actually competing views about explanation, either in general or of human 
action. While I happen to think that some jurisprudential disagreements are in 
fact the result of different views on the nature of (good) explanation, it is hard to 
see how a defender of jurisprudential descriptivism will find solace in this view. 
Accepting it implies that to the extent that jurisprudential disagreements are the 
result of epistemic evaluative disagreements, legal philosophers should turn away 
from the debates they have been engaged in and turn to the matters that are really 
behind their disagreements, i.e. the appropriate method for explaining human 
behavior, action, and institutions.  
The second potential challenge to my argument is that the source of 
evaluative disagreement is epistemic deficiency on matters of value. This is the 
possibility mentioned briefly at the beginning of the essay, according to which 
evaluative disagreements are a special case of epistemic deficiency. I do not think 
this is a very popular view, but it has its adherents; Ronald Dworkin, for example, 
may have been one of them. As I understand him, Dworkin believes legal and 
moral disagreements exist because we lack the powers of his imaginary judge 
Hercules, and correspondingly, that all such disagreements would have 
disappeared had we been omniscient like him. Would adopting this view make a 
difference to the question at hand? Technically, the answer is clearly “No,” 
because jurisprudential disagreements will still be evaluative, and more 
specifically, morally evaluative. More importantly, to try and explain the 
prevalence of jurisprudential disagreements within a descriptivist framework by 
appealing to this consideration implies that descriptivists should dedicate all their 
efforts to non-jurisprudential questions. On this view jurisprudential debates are 
ethical or metaethical debates masquerading as debates about the nature of law 
and there is little hope for one side convincing the other of the truth of its views 
until we find the truth regarding certain ethical questions. Put somewhat 








much more like Dworkin’s work in jurisprudence, work that has been, decidedly 
and consciously, non-descriptivist.19 
 
VII 
So far I have presented reasons to doubt the claim that jurisprudence is 
descriptive and considered several possible counterarguments. I wish to conclude 
with a positive explanation of the debates that make up what is said to be 
descriptive, or conceptual, jurisprudence in a way that will make sense of their 
persistence.  
Calling jurisprudence descriptive suggests that there exists a well-defined 
object that exists before the inquiry. That is indeed the assumption, usually 
implicit, one finds in the work of descriptivists. Raz, for instance, has stated that 
it is a mistake to think that “legal philosophy creates the concept of law” when 
“in fact it merely explains the concept that exists independently of it.”20 We have 
seen, however, that because there is no clearly-defined object, descriptive 
jurisprudence suffers from a fatal flaw of circularity, which can be avoided when 
we abandon this assumption. If we accept that law is a human creation, then 
what belongs in that category is itself determined by human attitudes. Though 
this is almost a truism among contemporary legal philosophers, especially legal 
positivists, the full implications of this idea have not been considered. The most 
significant one for present purposes is that since (for the most part) humans have 
no need for a clear-cut classification of law and non-law, there simply is no 
answer within the object itself to many of the questions that have been at the 
heart of descriptive jurisprudence, because there are no (consistent) human 
attitudes about them. This implies that there is no answer to many of the 
“descriptive” questions at the heart of contemporary conceptual jurisprudence—
Questions like: Is law necessarily coercive? Can moral norms be incorporated into 
the law? Are sanctions necessary for law?—because humans have not had any 
need to come up with answers to them. To give just one example, the claim that 
the concept of law does not necessarily involve sanctions has been challenged 
using thought experiments involving non-human societies. But since humans, 
whose attitudes constitute the object on which legal philosophers supposedly 
apply their conceptual analysis skills, have not troubled themselves with the 
question of law in non-human societies (the law of human societies giving them 
enough to worry about), it is a mistake to draw any inference from whatever it is 
one imagines is the right answer to these thought experiments, to any inquiry into 
the nature of law.  
The only way out of this is to try to describe not simply a human practice, but 
an idealization of it. Now, here there are two ways of identifying that ideal. One is 
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an attempt to strip from the practice what the theorist considers its underlying 
ideal. That, I trust it is clear, involves exactly the normative inquiry that 
descriptivists claim is not part of their inquiry. The difficulty is that the practice 
underdetermines its ideal and that consequently there is an infinite number of 
possible idealizations of it. The other possibility is that the ideal of law is itself an 
attitude the theorist tries to identify. On this view real-life law is a pale image of 
an abstract idea of law that the humans whose attitudes have constituted legal 
practice have created them with a certain ideal in mind. In that case, we might 
think of a “descriptive,” even “sociological” inquiry of this ideal. I take it that 
such ideals have indeed occupied lawyers and philosophers. The problem here, 
however, is not of a lack of an object to describe, but of a glut. History shows 
they have had many such ideals, and the choice among them inevitably takes us 
beyond description.  
All different ways of understanding jurisprudential practice thus show it to 
involve some kind of interpretation of the practice, i.e. the attempt to look at the 
practice and identify what is central to it and why this is so. This explanation 
seems plausible on its own: the most “descriptive” jurisprudence involves the 
sifting and organizing of certain facts as relevant, essential, important, 
illuminating and so on, from an infinite number of facts. This process is not 
descriptive, for making those judgments requires taking a certain normative 
perspective. It also provides a ready and simple explanation for our puzzle of 
persistent jurisprudential disagreement. Indeed, it does so while also explaining 
why such disagreements are often presented as though they are disagreement over 
a “descriptive” question. This is so, because such accounts appear to give us an 
account of what the practice “is,” not what it should be. These competing 
interpretations are thus normative, grounded in whatever normative 
considerations the theorist more-or-less explicitly recognizes as relevant for this 
inquiry. The persistence of jurisprudential disagreement is made possible by the 
fact that there is indeterminacy at all levels of this inquiry: of what belongs to the 
object of inquiry, of the standards by which to assess it, the content of those 
normative standards, the weighting of such different standards, and so on.  
I thus reach, relying on a somewhat different argument, a conclusion that is 
quite similar to the one reached by Ronald Dworkin. But Dworkin has made the 
further claim that jurisprudence is political in the sense that this shows that 
jurisprudence is part of political philosophy. Is this extra step warranted? If we 
agree that different “descriptive” theories of law are in fact different 
interpretations of legal practice, the question remains as to the relevant standard. 
In some loose and not very illuminating way we can talk of here of “importance” 
as the relevant standard, but if we try and consider what is important about law, 
it is safe to say, I think, without prejudicing my answer in favor of any view, that 
law is related to concepts like authority, morality, coercion, and legitimacy. All 
these are political concepts. Thus, any interpretation of what law is (what is 
important, illuminating, central, and so on about it) will require explaining how 
these concepts (or at least some of them) relate to law and to each other. Even if 








it, and cannot be the whole of it. Thus, even if not all interpretation of social 
practices is political, the interpretation of law is.  
 
VIII 
Even if all this is convincing, one may wonder why any of this matters. My real 
concern is broader than the seemingly technical question of whether 
descriptivism is defensible or not. My hope is that this essay will persuade readers 
of the need to turn away from descriptivism, because I believe descriptivism has 
led legal philosophers to spend an inordinate amount of time and energy on the 
wrong questions, and, perhaps worse, try to answer them, in ways that did not 
contribute to better understanding law. Given what I have just said, this claim 
requires some explanation. After all, if, as I have just contended, jurisprudential 
debates really are something different from what those engaged in them claim 
them to be, then the problem may not be with the debates themselves, only with 
their characterization. But the characterization of debates as conceptual does 
have very deleterious effects on jurisprudence. They involve many scholars 
engaged in questions for which the characterization offered here shows there is no 
“descriptive” or “conceptual” answer; they deepen the separation of 
jurisprudence from political philosophy and encourage the view that in answering 
questions in jurisprudence one should, as much as possible, stay clear of 
normative debates. As a result the descriptive bias in contemporary jurisprudence 
has led to the wrong answers to fundamental questions in jurisprudence and to 
the isolation of jurisprudence from legal practice, from the rest of legal academia, 
and even from the rest of contemporary philosophy.  
Part of the dominance of conceptual jurisprudence has involved the creation 
of an invented history, in which philosophers of past centuries, especially those 
considered founders of legal positivism, have had their philosophy of law made to 
fit descriptivist strictures leading to characterizations of their thought that bear 
only a tenuous relationship with their actual ideas. This is true of Hobbes, of 
Bentham, even to some extent of John Austin. This essay does not attempt to 
spell out what an alternative view of jurisprudence should look like, but these 
examples (to which one can add many more) suffice to establish one point: that 
the range of possibilities and views one could find in legal philosophy is as wide as 
what one finds within political philosophy. Under this characterization of 
jurisprudence the puzzle of persistent jurisprudential disagreements will no longer 
be a mystery, or at least not a greater mystery than the existence of persistent 
disagreements among political philosophers. More importantly, thus understood, 
the point of engaging in these persistent debates will become much easier to 
understand. On this view jurisprudential arguments will be understood not as 
attempts to describe law, but rather as attempts to persuade others of the 
superiority of a particular way of understanding and organizing legal phenomena 
based on a broader view on how life in a political community should be lived and 
the role law should play in it. Some works will be “interpretive” in that they will 
try to work by offering a politically-informed reading of existing practices; other 








characterization of justified legal practices independently of such practices. None 
should be “descriptive.”   
